| Prof: Jonathan
Bain |
|
Office: RH
201D
|
|
| Off. hr: W 1-2pm |
phone:
260-3688 |
I.
Description
Could a machine think?
Is artificial intelligence possible? Can androids embody
consciousness?
This course considers these and related questions concerning the nature
of the mind and its relation to bodies, both biological and
mechanical.
Topics include: Zombies, brains in vats, computational theories
of
mind, Turing machines, robots and consciousness, classical AI and
alternatives,
ethics and AI.
II.
Required
Texts
1. Kim,
Jaegwon (1996) The Philosophy of Mind, Westview Press.
2. Online
articles. (Public web-access and MyPoly restricted access.)
III.
Course
Requirements
| 1. |
You
will be required
to write three papers of about 5 pages each (typed, 10- or
12-point,
double-spaced, spell-checked!). Suggested topics for papers will
be provided at least 2 weeks before their due dates. |
| 2. |
One midterm
and one final will be given. They will consist of short
essay
questions. |
IV.
Grade Distribution
| Papers: |
3@10% = 30% |
| Midterm: |
35% |
| Final: |
35% |
VI.
Schedule of Topics:
Week 1
|
Introduction and Dualism:
Brains
in Vats
• Kim, Introduction, pp.
1-24.
• Descartes, Meditations
• Chalmers,
‘The Matrix as Metaphysics’ |
Week 2
|
Mind as Behavior:
Behaviorism
• Kim, Chap 1, pp. 25-46.
• Ryle,
‘Descartes’ Myth'
• Watson,
‘Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It’
• Putnam,
‘Brains and Behavior’ |
| Week 3 |
Mind as the Brain: The
Mind-Brain
Identity Theory
• Kim, Chap 3. pp. 47-72.
• Smart, ‘Sensations and
Brain
Processes’ (online at MyPoly)
• Putnam,
‘The Nature of Mental States' |
Week 4
|
Mind as Computer: Machine
Functionalism
and Classical AI
• Kim, Chap 4, pp. 73-96.
• Turing,
‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’
• Block,
‘What is Functionalism?’ |
Week 5
|
Objections to Classical AI:
The
Turing Test and the Chinese Room
• Kim, Chap 4, pp. 96-101.
• Block,
‘The Mind as the Software of the Brain’, sections 1 & 2
• Hutchens,
‘How to Pass the Turing Test by Cheating’
• Searle,
‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’ |
Week 6
|
Objections:
Gödel’s
Theorem
• Lucas,
‘Minds, Machines and Gödel’
• Penrose, excerpts from Shadows
of the Mind (online at MyPoly)
• Articles
in Pschye Vol. 2 symposium on Penrose |
Week 7
|
Objections: Consiousness --
Bats,
Zombies and Androids
• Kim, Chap 7, pp. 156-168
• Block,
‘Some Concepts of Consciousness’
• Nagel,
‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ |
Week 8
|
Objections: Consiousness,
cont.
• Kim, Chap 7, pp. 172-183.
• McGinn, ‘Can We Solve the
Mind-Body
Problem?’ (online at MyPoly)
• Chalmers,
‘Consciousness and Its Place in Nature’ |
Week 9
|
Alternatives to Classical
AI:
Connectionism
• Garson,
‘Connectionism’
• Churchland, ‘Cognitive
Activity
in Artificial Neural Networks’ (online at MyPoly) |
Week 10
|
Alternatives: Interactionism
• Dreyfus, excerpts from What
Computers Still Can’t Do (online at MyPoly)
• Haugeland, ‘Mind Embodied
and
Embedded’ (online at MyPoly)
• Brooks, ‘Intelligence
Without Representation' and ‘Elephants
Don’t Play Chess’ |
Week 11
|
Alternatives: Narrative
Intelligence
and Expressive AI
• Mateas
and Senger, ‘Narrative Intelligence’
• Mateas,
‘Expressive AI’ |
Week 12
|
Android Epistemology
• Boden, ‘Could a Robot Be
Creative
- And Would We Know?’ (online at MyPoly)
• Gomila, ‘From Cognitive
Systems
to Persons’ (online at MyPoly) |
| Week 13 |
The Ethical Robot
• Elton,
‘Robots and Rights: The Ethical Demands of Artificial Agents’
• Gips,
‘Towards the Ethical Robot’
• Minsky,
‘Alienable Rights’ |
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