Important Definitions in Chapter 3 (Predicate Calculus)

Def. 3.14. An interpretation I of \mathcal{L} consists of:

- 1. A non-empty set D_I (the domain of I).
- 2. A (possibly empty) collection of distiguished elements \overline{a}_i of D_i .
- 3. A (possibly empty) collection of functions $\overline{f_i}^n$ defined on D_r
- 4. A (possibly empty) collection of relations \overline{A}_{i}^{n} defined on D_{I} .

<u>Def. 3.17.</u> A valuation in *I* is a function $v : \{\text{terms in } \mathcal{L}\} \to D_I \text{ such that}$

- (i) $v(a_i) = \overline{a_i}$, for each constant a_i of \mathcal{L}
- (ii) $v(x_i)$ is arbitrary, for each variable x_i of \mathcal{L}

(iii) $v(f_i^n(t_1,...,t_n)) = \overline{f_i^n}(v(t_1),...,v(t_n))$, where f_i^n is a function letter of \mathcal{L} and $t_1,...,t_n$ are terms of \mathcal{L} .

<u>Def. 3.20.</u> Let *I* be an interpretation of \mathcal{L} and let *v* be a valuation in *I*. Given a *wf* \mathcal{A} of \mathcal{L} , *v* satisfies \mathcal{A} just when:

(i) If \mathcal{A} is atomic, $A_i^{n}(t_1, ..., t_n)$, then v satisfies \mathcal{A} if $\overline{A}_i^{n}(v(t_1), ..., v(t_n))$ is true in D_r .

- (ii) If \mathcal{A} is $(\sim \mathcal{B})$, then v satisfies \mathcal{A} if v does not satisfy \mathcal{B} .
- (iii) If \mathcal{A} is $(\mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{C})$, then v satisfies \mathcal{A} if either v satisfies $(\sim \mathcal{B})$ or v satisfies \mathcal{C} .
- (iv) If \mathcal{A} is $(\forall x_i)\mathcal{B}$, then v satisfies \mathcal{A} if for all valuations v' which are *i*-equivalent to v, v' satisfies \mathcal{B} .

<u>Def. 3.19.</u> Two valuations v, v' are *i*-equivalent if $v(x_i) = v'(x_i)$ for all $j \neq i$.

<u>Def. 3.24.</u> A *wf* \mathcal{A} is **true in an interpretation** I if every valuation in I satisfies \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} is **false in** I if there is no valuation in I that satisfies \mathcal{A} (*i.e.*, ($\sim \mathcal{A}$) is true in I).

<u>Notation</u>: $I \vDash \mathcal{A}$ (" \mathcal{A} is true in I" or "I semantically implies \mathcal{A} ")

<u>Def.</u> Let \mathcal{A}_0 be a *wf* of L (statement calculus) containing statement variables $p_{i_1}, ..., p_{i_k}$. Let $\mathcal{A}_1, ..., \mathcal{A}_k$ be *wf*s of \mathcal{L} (predicate calculus). Then the *wf* \mathcal{A} obtained by substituting each p_{i_j} in \mathcal{A}_0 with \mathcal{A}_j is called a substitution instance of \mathcal{A}_0 .

Def. 3.30. A wf \mathcal{A} of \mathcal{L} is a **tautology of \mathcal{L}** if it is a substitution instance of a tautology of L.

Def. 3.32. A $wf \mathcal{A}$ of \mathcal{L} is **closed** if it has no free occurrences of any variable.

<u>Def. 3.35.</u> A *wf* \mathcal{A} of \mathcal{L} is **logically valid** if \mathcal{A} is true in all interpretations of \mathcal{L} . \mathcal{A} is **contradictory** if it is false in all interpretations of \mathcal{L} .

<u>Notation</u>: $\models \mathcal{A}$ (" \mathcal{A} is logically valid")

<u>Notes</u>:

- Both tautologies of \mathcal{L} and logically valid wfs may be closed or open.
- If \mathcal{A} is a tautology of \mathcal{L} , then \mathcal{A} is logically valid (Prop. 3.31).
- Example of a wf that is logically valid but not a tautology of \mathcal{L} : $(\forall x_i)\mathcal{A} \to (\exists x_i)\mathcal{A}$.

Important Definitions and Propositions in Chapter 4 (Predicate Calculus)

Def. 4.2. A **proof in** K is a finite sequence of $wf_{\mathcal{S}} \mathcal{A}_1, ..., \mathcal{A}_n$ of \mathcal{L} such that any member is either an axiom of K or follows from previous members by MP or Gen.

If Γ is a set of *wfs* of \mathcal{L} , a **deduction from** Γ **in** K is a proof in K in which any member of the sequence can also be an element of Γ .

A wf \mathcal{A} of \mathcal{L} is a **theorem of** K if it is the last member of a proof in K.

<u>Notation:</u> $\Gamma \vdash_{K} \mathcal{A}$ (" \mathcal{A} is deducible from Γ in K" or " Γ syntactically implies \mathcal{A} in K") $\vdash_{K} \mathcal{A}$ (" \mathcal{A} is a theorem of K")

Prop. 4.5. (The Soundness Theorem for K) For any $wf \mathcal{A}$ of \mathcal{L} , if \mathcal{A} is a theorem of K, then \mathcal{A} is logically valid. (If $\vdash_{K} \mathcal{A}$, then $\models \mathcal{A}$.)

Prop. 4.8. (The Deduction Theorem for K) Let $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{C}$ be wfs of \mathcal{L} and let Γ be a (possibly empty) set of wfs of L. If $\Gamma \cup \{\mathcal{A}\} \vdash_{\kappa} \mathcal{B}$, and this deduction does not contain an application of Gen involving a variable that is free in \mathcal{A} , then $\Gamma \vdash_{\kappa} (\mathcal{A} \to \mathcal{B})$.

Def. 4.34. An extension S of K is either K itself or a formal system obtained by adding to or modifying the axioms of K in such a way that each theorem of K is also a theorem of S.

• S is called a **first order system**.

• If S, S' are two extensions of K, S' is an extension of S just when $\{S\text{-theorems}\} \subseteq \{S'\text{-theorems}\}$.

<u>Def. 4.36.</u> A first order system S is **consistent** if for no $wf \mathcal{A}$ are both \mathcal{A} and $(\sim \mathcal{A})$ theorems of S.

<u>Def. 4.38.</u> A first order system S is **complete** if for each closed $wf \mathcal{A}$, either $\vdash_{S} \mathcal{A}$ or $\vdash_{S} (\sim \mathcal{A})$.

Prop. 4.39. (Lindenbaum's Lemma for K) Let S be a consistent first order system. Then there is a consistent complete extension of S.

Prop. 4.40. Let S be a consistent extension of K. Then there is an interpretation of \mathcal{L} in which every theorem of S is true.

Prop. 4.41. (The Adequacy Theorem for K) If \mathcal{A} is a logically valid wf of \mathcal{L} , then \mathcal{A} is a theorem of K. (If $\vDash \mathcal{A}$, then $\vdash_{K} \mathcal{A}$.)

Def. 4.42.

- (1) If Γ is a set of wfs in \mathcal{L} , then a model of Γ is an interpretation of \mathcal{L} in which every wf of Γ is true.
- (2) If S is a first order system, then a **model of** S is a model of the set of theorems of S.

Prop. 4.44. A first order system S is consistent *iff* it has a model.

Prop. 4.47. (Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem) If a first order system S has a model, then S has a model whose domain is a countable set.

Prop. 4.48. (Compactness Theorem) Let S be a first order system. If every finite subset of axioms of S has a model, then S has a model.